What's gone wrong at Carlisle United
As Carlisle enter the finishing stretch of a season that has gone worse than could have been imagined, what exactly are the causes?
With now only 11 games left of a League One campaign that has verged on the historically bad, Carlisle sit bottom of the table 15 points from safety with the worst defensive record in the league and the joint second worst attacking record in the league. It is, by any measure, where the club deserve to be. In a season that is, by anyone’s measure, dire, it’s hard to identify what exactly went wrong for Carlisle United but that’s what I’ll try to do at length here.
We’ll look at the positives that brought Carlisle to promotion in the first place, try to find out what the catalyst for a run of form between November and March that saw Carlisle pick up only nine points out of 54 that took the side from the edge of the relegation spots to completely marooned and also to try to look at what is salvageable into next season, a season that will almost certainly be in League Two.
2022/23 vs 2023/24
On the barest numbers alone, Carlisle’s regression is very obvious.
While it goes without saying that you would expect Carlisle’s xG numbers to drop playing against a higher standard of opposition, the regression of how that has translated to actual figures is startling. Where in 22/23 Carlisle’s performance was broadly in line with their xG, this season, Carlisle are around half a goal a game worse off than they are expected to be with much of that being caused by a particularly anomalous record of conceding more than they should at Brunton Park. Some of these games are particularly maddening from a defensive perspective - for example, in the recent 4-0 loss at Brunton Park to Cambridge, Carlisle’s xGA was under 1.5. What we’re seeing is that, rather than Carlisle being uniformly dire across the season at home, their figures are inflated by some particularly shocking performances and that is reflected by Carlisle’s expected points being 38 as opposed to the 23 actual points they have.
Carlisle may well be always poor from an attacking sense (more on that later), they have the propensity to be occasionally exceptionally poor from a defensive one.
So, what exactly is going on here?
The first place to look is goalkeeping. I think it’s fair to say that most people were sceptical over the likelihood of Tomas Holy proving himself to be comfortable at League One level and so it’s proven. Using the stats from Opta, Holy’s Goals Prevented (open play goals excl OGs vs xGOT) is -1.2 across the games he played.
This, obviously, isn’t great. However, it compares fine to the appearances from promising young keeper Gabe Breeze (who would be around -5 extrapolating to the same game time) and the former Bradford keeper, Harry Lewis (purchased to be Carlisle’s Number 1), whose Goals prevented is an incredible -3.3 in spite of only having played half the time of Holy. Only Peterborough’s Nicholas Bilokapic (who was given a rest to “take him out of the firing line”) is in anything like the same sort of negative ratio as Lewis and, even then, is comfortably clear of him. While it’s possibly fair to attribute some of Lewis’ struggles to stepping up in standard and doing that in a struggling side (and, vs Burton midweek, he did go some way to redressing this balance), the goalkeeping situation is one that does still feel rather unresolved and that all Carlisle have really gotten out of the Lewis deal is another layer to a burgeoning rivalry with Bradford that will resume next season!
The Team as a Whole
How this all plays out in the wider numbers is easy to see. Carlisle have conceded 60 goals this season - ten more than their xG. If we turn that into xG difference, the second and third greatest underperformers are Wycombe and Exeter, who are 10.5 goals worse off than they should be.
Carlisle are at 16.1
That isn’t historically bad - Forest Green finished last season at -32 - the only sides to have such a difference and be in the relegation spots are Forest Green last season and Southend in 2019/20. Carlisle fans will not need a reminder as to how those two have followed up their League One relegation seasons.
As such, let’s dig down into the how of things and perhaps the most worrying stat that’ll be in this piece - Carlisle aren’t exploited.
When I say that, I’m talking about looking at the types of goals Carlisle have conceded. Knowing, as we do, that Carlisle concede lots, you would expect that to be shown in a type of goal. It is - from normal open play goals. From a coaching perspective, this is worrying but we’ll use the stats to explain why.
On average, sides in the league have conceded around 15 situational non-penalty goals this season (headers + direct free-kicks + long range shots). While Carlisle have conceded more from penalties this season than the league average (to be expected), on this metric, Carlisle are better than average, conceding only 12. Compare this to the sides around them - Fleetwood are at 20, Port Vale 18, Cheltenham and Charlton 15. Carlisle’s issues are the issues of just being bad at everything rather than being bad at a particular thing.
Defensively, Carlisle do have to do more work than most - the fifth most shots against per 90 in the League, the most defensive duels per 90 in the league (they and Cheltenham are way ahead of the rest of the division in that metric), the most interceptions per 90 all allied with one of the more intense presses in the division. As such, it’s perhaps unsurprising that while Carlisle’s xGA in the first half of games is broadly aligned to goals conceded (0.77 to 0.71), in the second half of a game, that balloons (0.94 to 0.72). Carlisle are a busy side in their pressing philosophy and a busy side in terms of how much work on top of that they’re being asked to do by the step up in quality and the result is that the side tires out and risks losing touch in games. With Carlisle also being one of the cleaner sides in the division, the ball is in play longer on top of all that, exacerbating the situation.
When it comes to passing metrics, Carlisle are about as unspectacular as it gets - outliers only really in the ineffectiveness of their progressive passing game (the second worst accuracy rate in the league) and the accuracy of their passing in general (fifth worst in the league but not exceptionally poor).
Which leads us to the attacking stats and what many would point to as the real issues. Some of this ties in with our statistics from before - the second worst success rate of dribbles in the league would tie in with Carlisle not having a great progressive passing game (as wingers aren’t getting the opportunities to take the ball forwards on the run), fourth worst for crossing accuracy in the division, worst in terms of the percentage of shots on target and (likely very closely linked) the side with the second most long shots in the league (Oxford, who top this, have a 40.5% shots on target rate, fully 10% higher than Carlisle).
All of this feeds into an impression of the weaknesses of Carlisle’s play - intense pressing but also under intense pressure leading to issues late in games, weak in terms of moving the ball forwards and meaning ball losses are likely in more dangerous areas and, when Carlisle do attack, not only being in less dangerous areas than most sides, but being less effective from those areas than any other side. It’s not surprising that this mix of issues has led to a season that has been both physically and mentally exhausting.
The Guy Effect
During the FA Cup loss to Leyton Orient, Carlisle midfielder Callum Guy was ruled out for the season after suffering a serious ACL injury. That game could also be described as the catalyst for Carlisle run which has ultimately doomed them. One big question that stands over this season is how closely related those two issues are.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it also marked a tactical shift in how the squad lined up as Carlisle dealt with three important changes in setup - injury to Guy, extended periods of unavailability of Paul Huntington and, eventually, the sale of Owen Moxon to Portsmouth.
Missing Huntington meant that Carlisle largely abandoned playing with three central defenders - from his first game missed at the end of September, Carlisle didn’t play with three CBs until 29 December. Usage of that formation appears clearly based around his availability.
The initial adjustment as Carlisle went to a four man defence was to a 4-2-3-1, with Guy and Moxon as a double pivot - this worked acceptably as Guy did the running which allowed Moxon to dictate play and concentrate on progressing the side forwards. Without Guy in the team, this meant trouble for a couple of reasons - firstly, if Carlisle wanted to move Jon Mellish into a midfield role, it meant the defence was weaker in possession and meant another change to organisation, secondly, if Carlisle wanted to cover Guy with another of the midfield options already at the club, such as Dylan McGeouch, they were naturally less physical and mobile than Guy. When one looks at heatmaps, no player has replicated the areas in which Guy did his work - McGeouch played far deeper, others have covered areas down particular channels but no-one has done their work in the centre of the field and been as much part of the spine of the side as Guy did.
This finally mutated into a 4-3-3 with January signing Harrison Neal filling the Guy role but, as a result, having to do more work as the sale of Moxon denied many a defensive outball and the signing of Josh Vela to be Moxon’s like for like replacement foundered. At its simplest, Guy’s and, to a lesser extent, Huntington’s availability issues have meant Carlisle have had to play in a shape they weren’t comfortable with and hadn’t recruited for - a side full of square pegs can only do so much.
In and of itself, this isn’t a criticism of Carlisle’s recruitment policy, merely pointing out two important trends - Carlisle have had trouble being settled in the centre of defence and that, with Guy out compounding that, they’ve been unable to field a settled spine of the side. Players have had to move around, players have left, players have joined but nothing has replicated the fluency that a Guy-Moxon combination deeper in midfield brought to the squad and, it was clear, that it was Callum Guy’s level of performance that brought a lot out of Moxon in the first place.
Summer Recruitment
Of the biggest bugbears of Carlisle fans, recruitment has undoubtedly been the most sizeable. It requires some context, however.
The summer window was carried out prior to the takeover of the club from the American Piatak family. The result of this was arguably the most financially constrained transfer window of any League One side outside of Reading and, even then, that’s debatable.
The winter window, while conducted with more in the way of financial ability, was also conducted in the knowledge that relegation was a likelihood. In short, both transfer windows of the 23/24 season have been carried out under considerable constraints on Carlisle’s attractiveness.
Much of the fan criticism has been around the attacking signings, with the likes of Sean Maguire, Danny Butterworth, Terry Ablade and Luke Plange all coming in over the summer and contributing five goals between the lot of them. Maguire, stepping down from the Championship, was the most heralded and, in his defence, has also been the busiest - averaging 0.22 xG per 90 and 0.05 xA per 90 which pretty comfortably puts him as the most dangerous attacking player Carlisle have on the spreadsheets. On the pitch, however, that’s translated to just the two goals, one of which came from the penalty spot. An xG per shot of 0.13 isn’t terrible and compares not too disfavourably to Alfie May, joint top scorer in the league. Whether Maguire can actually turn that around over time is another matter as this underperformance to xG is the trend of five of his last seven seasons.
Compare that to Jordan Gibson - Carlisle’s most productive attacking player in regard to the amount of shots he takes (third most in the league this season) and it’s very favourable. Gibson is at 0.045 xG per shot which is, well, it’s not great. Of the top twenty shot takers in League One this season, no player’s shots contributes as little xG as Gibson’s and it is not close (next is Demetri Mitchell whose xG per shot is 0.068). With Luke Plange (whose loan ended) not too dissimilar to Gibson and on the flank also, it perhaps explains some of Carlisle’s striking struggles if the most productive players on shots are the wingers who could and should be supplying them. The other striking summer signings have struggled to make any sort of impact.
Which means it’s time to look at Sam Lavelle.
Lavelle has, arguably, been the most criticised signing this season at Centre Back but perhaps what’s gone before in this piece goes a long way to explaining why that might be given the changes in defensive shape, the changes in what’s been directly in front of him and the pressure he’s been up against. If we compare him to Jon Mellish defensively, who would occupy the LCB position in a three compared to Lavelle’s RCB and Mellish comes out on top on almost every metric. Mellish gets through more duels per 90, wins more loose balls, intercepts and clears the ball more as well. While Lavelle has been exposed this season at points, likely not through all that much fault of his own given the context he’s had to play in, you would expect him to perform better when compared to Mellish who isn’t a full time centre back.
While the winter recruitment hasn’t necessarily had enough in the way of minutes to make entirely fair judgements on players, the earlier points around Neal and Vela stand - Neal has done admirably to attempt to fill the gap Callum Guy has left but has been put in a different formation and covers slightly different areas. As for Josh Vela, it probably serves my point to say that his stats don’t compare favourably to Taylor Charters, never mind Owen Moxon.
The Blame Game
After such an analysis, it’s fair to draw some conclusions as to the culpability for this season. As I think this piece has made clear, whatever your answer to this question, Carlisle’s injury issues have done them absolutely no favours whatsoever. Underperformance due to xG is one thing, but ultimately it is a tool that shows trends and massive differences in performance over a 12 month period aren’t that rare.
Yet other statistics when allied with the issues with recruitment most certainly do explain Carlisle’s issues.
While it was entirely fair to allow many players from League Two promotion the chance to prove themselves at this level, the injury to Paul Huntington meant Carlisle had to change defensive shape. Paul Simpson evidently did not feel that a three man defence of, presumably, Lavelle, Mellish and Barclay/Whelan was up to scratch at this level because the latter two names of those four probably aren’t League One players or, at the very least, aren’t to the standard of a covering defender organising the defence as Huntington is. Barclay has played as part of a defensive four but, particularly once Guy was injured and Mellish had to cover a bit more in midfield, it’s fair to characterise some of his appearances as enforced. Whelan isn’t even registered to play anymore.
What has been obvious from Callum Guy’s situation that Carlisle didn’t have a like for like replacement, they didn’t for Paul Huntington either and the injury to the former exacerbated the lack of cover for the former. From my own perspective of working with recruitment teams at clubs, while you obviously can’t have cover for every eventuality, lacking a like for like replacement for the entire spine of your side doesn’t reflect well on your recruitment. Had Harrison Neal (or similar) been at the club all season and Carlisle had been able to have a like-for-like replacement for Guy straight away, they would have had a better season. Huntington is a slightly more awkward player to replace but it’s clear his injury exposed a lack of depth in that area of the pitch. For that, it’s hard to not attribute some responsibility to either a) the financial situation at the club prior to takeover or b) Greg Abbott.
With all that in mind, Paul Simpson as manager doesn’t escape responsibility and the stats bear that clearly. Once those injuries came in, the tactical changes not only didn’t work, but the style of play has actively worked against a side that didn’t have the depth to work as physically as they’ve been asked to, particularly when you add one more stat to the mix - Carlisle have made the third fewest substitutions in the league. One can talk about Carlisle lacking depth, but when the players you do trust are playing more minutes than the sides around you, it’s inevitable that you do see things go quickly away from you later in games and that’s exactly what Carlisle have seen. Carlisle attempted to keep the same playing style without the depth to do so and without two key players to operating it.
2024/25
As we saw earlier, sides whose record has been similar to Carlisle’s this season have then followed those seasons with ones of extreme struggle in League Two. Carlisle do have a key advantage in that respect in that the takeover of the club this season means their financial position is far better than the position from which they got promoted.
Yet it’s clear that there is work to do. The goalkeeping situation isn’t sorted for the reasons mentioned above. If Carlisle return to the 3-5-2 that got them promoted, then numbers will be needed at the back for depth and, while Jack Armer will retain the left sided spot, the right sided one is up for grabs. The central midfield area is reasonably strong - Guy and Neal is a very strong double pivot at League Two level (and probably at League One level) and one would presume that Taylor Charters will be given the chance to be the advanced central midfielder full-time given the alternatives still at the club (Vela, McGeouch and McCalmont) may well not be dynamic enough.
That leaves the front two which would, presumably, be Luke Armstong and A N Other, which may be Georgie Kelly, the January signing who hasn’t yet been fit enough to appear.
The obvious question that hangs over it all is if this season has been a chastening enough experience for the Piataks as new owners to feel that Paul Simpson does not inspire their confidence enough to justify being given the chance to gain promotion back to League One (or if Simpson himself feels his time is up). The focus of the Piataks so far has been on the infrastructure of the club in attempting to sort out the training facilities, which do definitely need sorting, and about putting in key new appointments in academy recruitment, also very much needed after a decade of relative neglect. Should that focus need diverting due to a requirement to change manager, then changes may well be considerably more expansive.
Conclusion
The 23/24 season for Carlisle will go down in the annals as pretty historically bad. It seems unlikely Carlisle will manage to even reach 30 points and, should that mark not be reached, it will be Carlisle United’s lowest post-war points total.
United have battled against issues that were not entirely of their own making - they couldn’t control injuries or a lack of budget in the summer. However, it’s clear that it’s the issues that ARE of Carlisle’s own making - the lack of replacements for key players and roles, the lack of flexibility in defensive approach in spite of forced changes in defensive shape and personnel - are those that have meant that this season has gone from one where Carlisle perform broadly in line with their underlying statistics (which would have kept them firmly in touch to avoid relegation) into one where they have become detached and where this season is one that will ultimately live in infamy rather than fondly in the memory.