Over the past few years, we’ve seen the footballing gods be nothing if not merciless in ushering generations off the international stage. We can look at Germany in 2018, to Belgium in 2022 for proof that, if fate feels your time is up, it will rarely execute its judgement with anything other than extreme prejudice.
Croatia 2024 are on the verge of becoming another one on the list.
On reflection, it seems all very obvious. Croatia’s rise was built upon an undefeatable spirit and, less nebulously, on being able to keep the ball better and be more solid than other sides. They were not unbeatable - far from it - but they would always rise from the deck and win the war.
Except perhaps this time. What has happened?
Time
The lazy assumption is that Croatia simply got old. Luka Modric is 38, after all, he’s allowed to lose a step physically and in his vision. But Luka Modric also entered the tournament having just signed an extra year with Real Madrid. I think it’s fair to say that if Carlo Ancelotti, a manager now in any discussion about the greatest managers of all time, thinks that Luka Modric can do another season, then neither I nor anyone else should be casting doubts on Modric.
Ivan Perisic, then? How could he be sharp at 35 on the back of a major knee injury that meant he hadn’t played 90 mins all season? While Perisic may have been a bit less combative than usual and not throwing himself into challenges as much, there was certainly no sign that his innate talent at crossing the ball and beating a man had diminished much at all.
Time does catch up with everyone but, for the oldest members of the Croatian squad, it does still seem that they still run a little ahead of father time as things stand. So, if not that, then what?
Broz
Croatia found themselves with an issue post 2018. The retirement of Ivan Rakitic meant that the initial midfield triangle (Rakitic-Kovacic-Modric) was broken up. In doing so, it meant Modric moved back into the Rakitic deeper playmaker role. However, it pushed Zlatko Dalic into an adjustment - rather than moving someone into the attacking midfield role, he moved Brozovic into a defensive midfield role.
For a time, this worked - Broz’s natural game of running about and tackling things released Modric and Kovacic to share more playmaking work as they knew they had cover behind them. The Croatian game plan changed shape to 4-3-3 rather than 4-2-3-1 but the game plan didn’t have to adapt at all as the 2018 Modric role was simply shared.
In 2024, this has failed spectacularly. Brozovic moved to Saudi Arabia in 2023 and has come back looking a shadow of the player Croatia relied upon. In the interim, two depth issues have plagued Croatia - a lack of a like-for-like replacement for Brozovic and a lack of a like-for-like replacement for 2018 Modric.
The stats bear this out - in Qatar, Brozovic averaged 17 duels won per 90 and 9.1 recoveries per 90. In Germany, his first two games saw him compete in 8 duels and complete 7 recoveries total. Brozovic’s time at this level is simply done and no other conclusion is really reachable.
Croatia neither had a like for like replacement in the squad nor did Zlatko Dalic recognise a tactical shift was needed quickly enough. The result was not just playing an ineffective player, but forcing Modric and Kovacic to have to do additional defensive work which they hadn’t needed to in years and, as a result, Croatia lacked fluency defensively and were too easily dragged out of position - both Spain and Albania exploited this ruthlessly.
The Squad as a whole
The Brozovic situation wouldn’t be such an issue had adequate replacements been available. The annoying thing is that they were in the preliminary squad. Petar Sucic, Kristijan Jakic and Niko Sigur, all of whom could play that role, were in the preliminary squad. Nikola Moro (albeit not as dynamic as Broz) was there in the March Friendlies. While all four of those names don’t necessarily offer you peak Brozovic, they offer plenty more than THIS Brozovic. That was one issue - far from the only one.
The other issues are further up the park and simply that Croatia lacked the options to play differently. Nikola Vlasic proved a waste of a space as his recovery from injury was derailed after the point at which he could be replaced but the options between attack and midfield were unproven - Luka Sucic and Martin Baturina both sit under 10 caps and those primarily being from the bench. To alter to 4-2-3-1 and back to the 2018 shape means taking a risk and, while it was set up to do so against Albania, Dalic chose not to.
On top of that, the wide areas are problematic. Andrej Kramaric isn’t a left winger. Lovro Majer isn’t a right winger. The naturally wide options in the squad of Perisic, Pjaca and Marco Pasalic are dribblers rather than players to take people on for sheer pace. The result was that while Croatia played consistently on the front foot, that front foot was moving centimetres forward rather than metres.
All of these issues had solutions if Zlatko Dalic was open to them.
The Shape
Croatia’s key issue now is shape. For long term observers, whinging that Croatia don’t play three at the back is memeable at this point. But four at the back didn’t work in Germany. It forces the likes of Gvardiol and Stanisic who have become more centre backs than anything to be out and out defensive full backs. The result is that you don’t get them at their best defensively or from an attacking sense. It also means that the defensive role in which Croatia are compromising is with the centre back who is pairing Sutalo.
Or you could play Sutalo in the middle of a three with Stanisic and Gvardiol either side of him. Doing so would then position Josip Juranovic and Borna Sosa to be proper wing backs. This would be important as the narrow Croatian attacking shape seen at Euro 2024 prevents Juranovic from making the inverted runs which make him so dangerous in the first place. Given there aren’t any young players coming through imminently who jump out and make you think that maintaining a winger based play is worth skipping over a wing-back based style, that set up would easily last the next four years without much rotation needed.
That doesn’t necessarily sort out Croatia’s other options, but for a side that has looked so open and so desperate when it comes to pace and width, it cures some ills. Given Croatia’s striking cohort coming through of Matkovic, Beljo, Simic, Matanovic are all big players who can offer an aerial option, it’s also a positive transitional move for that role. Given Budimir is here at this tournament, it would have worked in Germany as well.
The Brozovic issue shows the fragility of Dalic-Ball, arguably in both its forms - it is overly reliant on one specific role in terms of how one does the water-carrying for the creative players. If that role breaks down, it all breaks down. The team is always carrying a player and how that relationship works is, as we’ve seen, the vital cog that makes everything else.
The Coda
Writing this between the Albania and Italy games means things are still up in the air about Croatia’s participation. If Dalic has learned his lessons, things could turn around very quickly and the pre-tournament hype could still be realised.
But it doesn’t feel very likely. Croatia were opened up for fun by Albania and Spain - Italy aren’t a high scoring side so may not have quite as much joy but, even so, it’s hard to think of any side in the Euros that wouldn’t currently score and make ample chances against this iteration of Croatia. The Portugal friendly may have shown reasons to be cheerful, but it becomes ever clearer that, when the intensity and speed are turned up a notch, Croatia aren’t quite at the level they thought they were and are, perhaps, more at the level their qualifying campaign was at. For a side whose discourse has been built upon defy expectations, the biggest surprise is that Croatia has actually failed to meet them.
And while I’m loathe to criticise Zlatko Dalic given his record as national team manager, it’s hard not to think this was all avoidable - a better selection, a quicker reaction to form, a greater flexibility. Whatever the result against Italy, and for the remainder of the tournament, those criticisms and doubts will last beyond this tournament and ask, for the first time, whether Dalic has reached the end of the road.